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Commensurability and Its Constitutional
Consequences
by
FREDERICK SCHAUER*
For at least a generation, and possibly much longer, philosophers
have been debating whether all values are commensurable. On one
side of the debate is a tradition, with roots as far back as Jeremy Ben-
tham, associated most directly with modem utilitarianism. This tradi-
tion holds that all values are commensurable, that there is-at least in
theory-a way of comparing any value with any other, and a way of
reducing all values to a single metric. On the opposite side of the
debate is an account, associated both with nonconsequentialism and
with pluralist versions of consequentialism, maintaining that at least
some values are irreducibly incommensurable-that they cannot, at
bedrock, be measured against each other or converted into a common
currency.
It should come as no surprise that the incommensurability ques-
tion has a number of concrete constitutional and legal implications.'
Although the constitutional import of one position or another in the
debate about commensurability is itself contestable, it is at least plau-
sible to conclude that certain legal methodologies-so-called "balanc-
ing" being the most obvious-presuppose something resembling
broad-based commensurability, and that certain legal structures-
such as judicial enforcement of rights even against the interests of the
majority-are most at home within a framework that recognizes the
irreducible incommensurability of values.
I have three aims in this Article, but none of them involves at-
tempting to resolve the philosophical question whether values are or
are not, as an ontological matter, commensurable. First, I want to
* Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University. This Article was first presented at a Symposium on con-
stitutional valuation at the Hastings College of the Law, February 26, 1994. I am grateful
to Richard Pildes for his extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Yet, as with many debates about moral theory, the commensurability debate also
has fewer legal and constitutional implications than some people suppose.
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sketch the various positions in the debate as I understand it, in the
hope that this descriptive enterprise will help others to understand
some of the existing terrain.2 Second, I will venture some deliberately
tentative thoughts about the constitutional implications of holding one
position or another in the commensurability debate. 3 And third, turn-
ing to what I consider the core of the argument, I will offer a theoreti-
cal account of the legitimacy of trying to resolve the commensurability
debate by reference to the consequences of holding one position or
another.4 Drawing on a tradition going back to John Stuart Mill's dis-
cussion of justice in Utilitarianism,5 and represented by much of the
more recent writing about utilitarian dispositions, I will argue conse-
quentially, or at least instrumentally, that there is nothing disingenu-
ous or otherwise morally suspect in selecting midlevel philosophical
positions strategically on the basis of their expected consequences.
Just as Mill argued that we should choose to inculcate and internalize
a sense of justice because doing so would maximize utility,6 I will ar-
gue that we might choose to internalize a view of commensurability or
incommensurability based on an admittedly instrumental calculation
of which position would better serve deeper noninstrumental values.
Accepting this strategic or instrumental approach will not resolve the
commensurability debate, either for philosophers or for lawyers, espe-
cially because any account of the instrumental desirability of certain
midlevel principles or ideas will invariably be temporally and cultur-
ally contingent. Still, making the case for an instrumental approach to
the commensurability debate may provide additional resources by
which some of the legal debates about commensurability may be eval-
uated, and may at the same time show the philosophical and legal con-
troversies to be more distinct from each other than has commonly
been supposed.
The philosophical debate about commensurability takes place
within the realm of practical philosophy, the domain in which we
think about what to do, rather than within the realm of theoretical
philosophy, the domain in which we think about what is or about what
2. See Part I infra.
3. See Parts II-III infra.
4. See Part IV infra.
5. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 189
(Max Lerner ed., 1961) [hereinafter Mill, Utilitarianism].
6. Id. at 226-48.
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to believe.7 The distinction between the two realms is important here
because no one does or could plausibly maintain that all theoretical
values are commensurable. With all due respect to Justice Scalia, and
also to the organizers of this Symposium, who have borrowed Justice
Scalia's deceptively appealing but tendentious and misleading meta-
phor about the impossibility of comparing the length of a line with the
heaviness of a rock, 8 no one contends that length and weight can be
reduced to a single measure, any more than people contend that color
and smell can be measured along a unitary metric. To suppose this
would be absurd, which is perhaps why no one has supposed it, and
which is why it is misleading to characterize the claim to commensura-
bility in the terms chosen by Justice Scalia and by our otherwise gra-
cious hosts.
When we enter the realm of practical reason, the argument for
commensurability becomes much more plausible. Associated most
closely with the tradition of utilitarianism, proponents of commensu-
rability within that tradition maintain that agents always choose the
most valuable among competing alternatives for action, that the most
valuable action among the available alternatives is necessarily the one
that will produce the greatest increase in utility, and that this assess-
ment is, in theory, always possible, because any proposed course of
action can be measured in terms of its effect on utility.9 The argument
for commensurability, if successful, thus concludes that all decisional
options can, in theory, be reduced to a single value, and that deci-
sional options can hence be evaluated by first comparing the expected
value of each and then selecting the option with the greatest expected
value.
7. The distinction is usefully described in Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100
YALE L.J. 1611, 1614-20 (1991).
8. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). The Symposium brochure compounds the felony (well, maybe it's only a mis-
demeanor) by describing the attempts to weigh individual rights with public values as a
"madness" that could only be believed in Wonderland. The existing state of play of the
commensurability debate does not yet, as I will show, justify that level of dismissiveness of
either side of the debate. Moreover, even the opponents of commensurability recognize
that incommensurability does not entail noncomparability. Those who believe, for exam-
ple, that the values of bodily integrity are incommensurable with money need not deny
that it is rational to risk a minor bodily injury in order to gain a great deal of money.
9. See, e.g., Joseph Raz & James Griffin, Mixing Values, in 65 THE ARISTOTELIAN
SocmT' 83, 101 (Supp. 1991); James Griffin, Are There Incommensurable Values?, 7 PHiL.
& PuB. Am. 39 (1977) (arguing that values are commensurable); Donald H. Regan, Au-
thority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 995, 1056-
75 (1989).
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Even assuming that utility, in some form or another,10 is the com-
mon single value by which decisional options can be measured, it is
important to note that nothing in the argument for commensurability
entails the conclusion that utility can be further reduced to money or,
conversely, that money is the best measure of utility. It is perhaps not
surprising that some people think that a commitment to commensura-
bility (or even to utilitarianism generally) presupposes or entails a
commitment to monetarization or commodification. 11 Money is in
fact a common measure for many things, and money is often used by
the law as its vehicle for compensation for harms neither immediately
nor naturally valued in monetary terms (e.g., pain and suffering,
mental anguish, injury to noncommercial reputation, loss of consor-
tium, invasion of privacy, and deprivation of personal constitutional
rights). Moreover, some economists (and others as well) subscribe
both to utilitarianism and to the view that money is the best measure
of utility. And finally, the debate about the use and misuse of cost-
benefit (or risk-benefit) analysis is one in which the commensurability
position is ordinarily manifested in dollar terms. 12 Yet the supposition
that monetarization follows from commensurability is still a non se-
quitur. One could believe, for example, that utility was a matter of
10. A good overview of the varieties of utilitarianism is in Dan W. Brock, Recent
Work in Utilitarianism, 10 AM. PHIL. Q. 241 (1973).
11. "Entails" is perhaps slightly too strong, but arguments against commensurability
often move quite quickly from acknowledging the lack of a necessary connection between
commensurability and commodification (which I take to be the treatment of something as
a thing that can be bought and sold for money) to arguments largely against the use of
money as the currency of commensurability. A good example is Cass Sunstein, On Incom-
mensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779 (1994).
On commodification in general, see Scott Altman, (Com)Modifying Experience, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 293 (1991); Elizabeth Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity, 19 PHIL. &
Pun. A1F. 71 (1990); Margaret Jane Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in MARKETS
AND JUsTICE: NoMos XXXI 165 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989);
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1986). Implicit in what I say
here is that one can recognize the contingent advantages of commensurability without
committing to commodification, although it may be another implication of my argument
that commodification can also be thought of as morally desirable at some times and in
some places.
12. See, e.g., BARUCH FiSCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK (1981); EDITH STOKEY &
RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (1978); Alan Gewirth, Human
Rights and the Prevention of Cancer, 17 AM. PHIL. Q. 117, 122-23 (1980); Harold P. Green,
The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791 (1975);
Sheldon Samuels, The Uncertainty Factor, 363 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 269 (1981); Fred-
erick Schauer, Legal Process and the Identification of Human Values, 9 AM. J. INDUsT.
MED. 75 (1986); Laurence Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 66, 90-91 (1972).
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preference-satisfaction or desire-satisfaction, -or pleasure-seeking, or
even some less personal (less subjective) measure of well-being, while
still believing that money was not necessarily the only or the best or
even a good measure of, say, pleasure. While money brings pleasure
to many people, and while money allows people to buy many things
that will increase their pleasure, a pleasure-oriented utilitarian could,
consistent with her utilitarianism, still believe that there are pleasures
that money cannot buy. It is of course true that there are better devel-
oped social mechanisms for measuring money across persons than
there are mechanisms for measuring pleasure across persons. But for
purposes of the philosophical debate about utilitarianism, these mech-
anisms are somewhat beside the point. There are good reasons to re-
sist measuring all value in dollars, but the argument that dollars are
not the irreducible measure of value no more proves that there is no
irreducible measure of value than the argument that money cannot
buy love proves that there is no such thing as love.
With the money issue aside for now, it becomes clear, in the ab-
sence of existing mechanisms for the inter-personal measurement of
things like happiness or pleasure,13 that the commensurability debate
within the philosophical community is not one that has as many direct
real-world applications as might first be supposed. Still, noting the
basic positions in the debate will be useful for what follows. Thus, it is
worthwhile to compare the basic commensurability position with two
different types of anticommensurability argumentg, one (like utilitari-
anism) a variety of consequentialism, and the other decidedly anticon-
sequentialist. The consequentialist anticommensurability position is
based on the possibility of a multivalued consequentialism. It is true
that univalued (or monistic) forms of consequentialism are the most
common forms of consequentialism, and that utilitarianism is the most
common form of univalued consequentialism. There are, however,
versions of consequentialism that recognize a plurality of ultimate or
irreducible values while still believing that practical reasoning involves
the task of assessing which course of action will produce the best con-
sequences, as measured in terms of multiple irreducible values.14 This
13. See generally INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John
E. Roemer eds., 1991); JON ELSTER & AANuND HYLLAND, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
CHOICE THEORY (1986).
14. The best example of a consequentialist position with multiple primary goods is
GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (1903). More recently, the same structure
is endorsed in much of the work of Amartya Sen. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, COLLECIVE
CHOICE AND SocIAL WELFARE (1970); AMARTYA SEN & BERNARD WILLIAMS, Introduc-
tion, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 1, 16-20 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds.,
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pluralist, or multivalued, variety of consequentialism might of course
have difficulty providing a procedure for decision making once the
irreducible values come into conflict with each other. Yet, the exist-
ence of such possibly irreconcilable quandaries does not by itself un-
dermine the consequentialism of a consequentialist position that
maintains both that there is a plurality of incommensurable values,
and that, absent conflicts among those values, the task of deciding
what to do is always one to be performed solely in light of the conse-
quences of the various proposed actions.15
Although multivalued consequentialism is a plausible foundation
for a belief in incommensurability, more commonly we see a close af-
finity between a belief in incommensurability and a rejection of conse-
quentialism. Those who believe, for example, that certain activities
(such as torturing, killing, lying, or betraying a friend) are simply
wrong regardless of their consequences are likely to believe that the
wrongness of, say, torturing is not measured in the same terms as the
increase in welfare that might be brought from some act of torture.
Thus the wrong of torture can be taken as a trump or side constraint
on welfare maximization in all possible cases.' 6
The existence (or not) of incommensurable values can thus be
either the product or the proof of the truth (or not) of anticonsequen-
tialism. That is, those who believe initially in the truth of anticonse-
quentialism may see the incommensurability of values as one
consequence or product of their anticonsequentialism. And those
who believe initially in the truth of the claim of incommensurability
may take that belief as itself as strong grounds for rejecting conse-
quentialism. The methodology of moral theory is pivotal here. If we
are reasoning from the "top down," one starts with anticonsequential-
ism as moral theory, and reasons from that relatively abstract position
1982). See also the discussion of pluralism in SUSAN L. HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS:
PERSONALTY AND POLITY 193-96 (1989).
15. I understand Joseph Raz's current project to include the task of trying to work out
how a pluralist consequentialist might deal nonarbitrarily and rationally with conflicts
among primary and incommensurable values. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREE-
DOM 339-40 (1986); Raz & Griffin, supra note 9, at 83; Joseph Raz, Facing Up: A Reply, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1220-22 (1989).
16. On this picture of deontological limitations on consequentialist maximization, see
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); JUDITH
JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN
INTRODUcTION TO ETHICS 98-107 (1972). On incommensurability from a nonconsequen-
tialist perspective, see Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS
128 (1979); Bernard Williams, Conflicts of Values, in MORAL LUCK 71 (1981).
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to a belief in the incommensurability of particular values. If instead
one reasons from the "bottom up," one's belief in the primary or intu-
itive truth of certain ground-level incommensurabilities will be used to
generate an anticonsequentialist moral framework. And if following
the Rawlsian method of reflective equilibrium one does both,17 then
incommensurability remains a central question in working out both
large moral theories and more particular visions of what to do in indi-
vidual cases.
II
Although it should thus be clear that there is a close relationship
between debates about commensurability and many of the enduring
questions of moral philosophy, I do not want to try to resolve the
commensurability debate here, nor do I want to try to resolve the
even larger debates of which the commensurability debate is but a
part. Rather, having first sketched the debate, I will proceed to sug-
gest some of that debate's possible legal and constitutional conse-
quences. My central agenda, however, will be to show why the latter
might be more relevant to resolve the debate than commonly sup-
posed-why it is appropriate to try to resolve the commensurability
debate by recourse to the consequences of holding one position or
another within it.
A useful starting point, especially in considering the focus of this
Symposium, is the question of balancing in constitutional law. In con-
sidering the question of constitutional balancing, however, it will be
useful to delineate four distinguishable processes, all frequently re-
ferred to as "balancing""' but nevertheless interestingly different from
each other. The first, perhaps the dominant vision, is the one in which
there seems to be a clash between nonconsequentialist rights and non-
rights-based interests. The rights I speak of here are the kinds of
rights that a nonconsequentialist would consider to be nonconsequen-
17. JoHN RAWLS, A THEoRY oF JusTICE 48-51 (1971).
18. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.. 943 (1987). The word "balancing" strikes me as misleading, because it sug-
gests some sort of antecedent equipoise between the values weighed against each other, or
at least a lack of weighing as we go about the process. Yet once we recognize that there is
a difference between nonweighted consideration of primary values and weighted (prima
facie, presumptive, etc.) consideration of the same values, we see that the word "balanc-
ing" may be too simple. Those who, for example, describe "balancing" as a process in
which First Amendment rights can be overridden by a "clear and present danger," are
either taking a (controversial) position about the lack of any actual decisional difference
between a clear and present danger standard and some lower level of scrutiny, or are con-
flating through use of a single word what are in fact quite divergent decision procedures.
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tialist' 9-Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion
and perhaps to some dimensions of the freedom of speech, Fourth
Amendment rights of privacy, Fifth Amendment rights to be free from
compulsory self-incrimination, Fourteenth Amendment equality
rights, and Fifth and Fourteenth amendment substantive due process
privacy and autonomy rights. And the interests commonly counter-
poised to these rights involve an aggregation of what some would call
public values, others would call utility, others would call the general
welfare, and still others would call the public, state or national inter-
est. Regardless of the label, however, this debate replicates in consti-
tutional clothing the classic philosophical debate between
consequentialism and deontological rights.20 The structure of the phil-
osophical question about whether to torture one person in order to
save the lives of many is, in important ways, the same as the structure
of a constitutional debate about whether to permit discrimination on
the basis of race in order to promote a non-rights-based public inter-
est.2 ' When applied to such constitutional issues, the metaphor of bal-
ancing is commonly used to mark two sides of the debate. From one
side the proponents of balancing are accused of failing to recognize
the essentially nonbalanceable (and so incommensurable) nature of
the individual rights claim.22 From the other side, opponents of bal-
ancing are accused of failing to recognize that rights-based or deonto-
logical constraints need not be absolute in order to have genuine
decisional import.23 In terms of this debate, therefore, it would be
19. 1 put it this way to emphasize the oft-neglected point that nonconsequentialism or
anticonsequentialism are not comprehensive positions, in the sense of claiming that all
decisions can be made without reference to consequences. The typical anticonsequentialist
denies only that consequentialism can decide all cases, and thus logically accepts the possi-
bility that consequentialism can decide some (or many) cases.
20. See, e.g., J.J.C. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST
(1973).
21. One can recognize this structure in, for example, Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), while still believing that the Court dramatically overestimated the threat
to the public interest and dramatically undervalued the individual right. The same struc-
ture, but with better results, is seen in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), and in West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
22. This was true in the classic free speech debates of a generation ago. See Laurent
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.. 1424 (1962); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245; Wallace Men-
delson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REv.
821 (1962).
23. This happens to be my own view. See Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the
Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REv. 415 (1993); Frederick Schauer, Can Rights Be Abused?,
31 PHIL. Q. 225, 227 (1981). For earlier, more extensive, and better elaborations of similar
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plausible to suppose (although I will question this supposition later in
this section) that a belief in incommensurability would produce less of
a willingness to recognize the strength of non-rights-based interests
when individual rights were at issue, because a commitment to incom-
mensurability would involve at least a partial block on recognition of
those interests. Conversely, a belief in commensurability would re-
move this block, and so it is thus plausible to suppose that such a
belief would produce a lesser degree of protection of individual rights.
Although some constitutional rights are plausibly nonconsequen-
tialist, not all are. Even those who believe that some constitutional
rights are nonconsequentialist or morally primary can identify other
rights as consequentialist. Consequentialist constitutional rights stra-
tegically create individual rights not because of the intrinsic impor-
tance of the rights, but because, in the long run, creating and enforcing
those rights will be the best for the public interest. A good model is
Ronald Dworkin's characterization of freedom of the press. For
Dworkin this freedom is based not on the intrinsic importance of giv-
ing the press equal concern and respect, but rather on the institutional
and utilitarian advantages of giving the press an enforceable immunity
from a wide range of potential governmental restrictions. 24 Similarly,
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms appears to be
highly consequentialist, as does the Seventh Amendment's right to
trial by jury in civil cases, and the Sixth Amendment rights to compul-
sory process and public trial. When these consequentialist constitu-
tional rights conflict with nonconstitutionalized consequentialist
"interests" like public safety or governmental efficiency, the process
of deciding might be seen as arguably different from that involved
when rights in the deontologically strong sense are on one side of the
balance. Now the interests on both sides are consequentialist and
thus, in theory, commensurable. Yet it could still be argued that the
very purpose of constitutionalization of interests that are not, at bed-
rock, deontological rights is to compel public decisionmakers (includ-
ing but not limited to judges), for strategic reasons of allocation of
positions, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights, 19 ARIZ. L. REv. 45
(1977); Robert Nozick, Moral Complications and Moral Structures, 13 NAT. L. FORUM 1
(1968); Rolf Sartorius, Utilitarianism, Rights, and Duties to Self, 22 AM. PHIL Q. 241
(1985).
24. RONALD DwoRK N, The Farber Case: Reporters and Informers, and Is the Press
Losing the First Amendment?, in A MA=TER OF PRiNCIPLE 373, 381 (1985). Dworkin's
views are particularly illustrative here because he so clearly distinguishes the nonconse-
quentialist (to him) right to free speech from the consequentialist right to freedom of the
press.
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power and distrust of excessively act-based decisionmaking, to treat
certain interests as if they were strong rights, even though they are
not. It may be, therefore, that one way of seeing the constitutional
entrenchment of interests in the costume of rights is as a decision (re-
sembling some varieties of rule-utilitarianism) at the constitution-
making stage-to treat certain theoretically commensurable interests
as incommensurable just because of a distrust of the actual process of
commensurating on a case-by-case basis. This, once again, reflects the
common (but possibly incorrect, as I shall suggest) view that treating
rights and interests as incommensurable may in practice produce a
greater protection of rights than would otherwise be the case.
Regardless of the deep source of the rights involved, however,
both of these first two modes of balancing do counterpoise a right on
one side against a nonright on the other. Thus we speak of balancing
when courts are called upon to decide whether a state concern with
crime control justifies restricting one's freedom to practice one's reli-
gion,25 or whether a national concern with defense and national secur-
ity justifies restricting the freedom of the press.26 In a third type of
situation in which the metaphor of balancing appears, however, there
are individual rights on neither side, even though the issue may in-
volve constitutional concerns. Instead, interests and only interests are
on both sides of the balance. Separation of powers cases are prototyp-
ical here, for the nonexistence of any kind of individual right does not
keep the courts from having to weigh consequentialist interests. For
example, courts balance executive power against equally consequen-
tialist interests in legislative prerogative, 27 or consequentialist inter-
ests in federal immunity from state taxation against consequentialist
state interests in preserving their tax base.28 It is true that Justice
Scalia's concerns as expressed in Bendix Autolite question whether
balancing that is underdetermined by formal law (regardless of what
one considers to constitute formal law) should be done by the courts.
But that issue is separate from the identification of a range of un-
doubtedly constitutional controversies in which the central concerns
of the commensurability debate seem largely absent.
25. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
26. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (per curiam).
27. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
28. See, e.g., Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
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The existence of cases involving so-called "balancing" yet without
strong individual rights on either side suggests the fourth type of bal-
ancing case-one in which strong rights directly conflict with each
other. The classic free press/fair trial controversy is traditionally dis-
cussed in such terms,29 and more recently, conflicts between free
speech and racial or gender equality have frequently been couched in
balancing rhetoric.30 Here the commensurability debate is again rele-
vant, for if equality values are not fungible with public safety values,
then nor do they seem to be fungible with, say, the kinds of freedom
of thought and freedom of conscience values that might undergird the
free exercise and free speech clauses of the First Amendment. But
unlike the case of rights opposed to nonrights interests, at first blush it
does not appear as if anything would turn on the resolution of the
commensurability controversy. Whether free exercise of religion or
freedom of speech is or is not commensurable with equality will not
eliminate the inevitability of making a decision when the two collide,
and thus may not much influence a necessary process plausibly char-
acterized as "balancing." Although rights versus rights cases may be
the most morally problematic of constitutional cases, perhaps it is less
in the rights versus rights cases than in the rights versus interests cases
that the resolution of the commensurability controversy might actu-
ally make something of a difference.
IMI
Thus, the impact of a resolution of the commensurability debate
on constitutional decisionmaking may not be the same in all types of
decisions frequently referred to as "balancing," but will be greatest in
central rights versus interests cases. But before accepting this conclu-
sion in so simple a form, let us look more closely at the relationship of
each of these varieties of balancing to the philosophical commensura-
bility debate. Justice Scalia in Bendix Autolite appears to believe that
courts are good only at measuring commensurables, for he takes the
existence of incommensurable values as a sufficient condition for leav-
29. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE
FmIsT AMENDMENT AND THE FIFrH ESTATE: REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS
MEDIA 542-57 (1986).
30. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE Li. 431; Toni M. Massaro, Equality
and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211
(1991); Mai . Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MicH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
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ing a decision to legislative or majoritarian processes. More com-
monly, however, the argument runs in the opposite direction. If all
values are commensurable, some would say, then there is little man-
date for plucking some interests out of what is in fact a fungible subset
and allocating the calibration and protection of those interests to a
distinct institution, such as the courts.31 But if values are incommen-
surable, and if we cannot determine how much of a loss of freedom of
religion is worth how much of a gain in public safety, then it may be
important to keep the decisionmaking as separate as we keep the val-
ues. Thus, although Ronald Dworkin has, in the context of debates
about the soundness of the "right answer" thesis, expressed sympathy
for large-scale commensurability, 32 his basic argument about judicial
power is one that appears to flow out of the central incommensurabil-
ity position. If, Dworkin argues, rights are side constraints or trumps
on utilitarian calculations, and if there is a close affinity between utili-
tarianism and majoritarian democracy, then it is important to have
31. This is not the only possible conclusion that comes out of a commensurability
premise, of course. It might be that certain values within the commensurable universe of
values were particularly vulnerable to infringement, in which case it might appear advisa-
ble, despite commensurability, to erect special barriers (either by special forms of institu-
tional protection, or by calling them "rights," or both) around some interests but not
around others. Still, it seems safe to say that the case for special protection flows some-
what more easily out of an incommensurability premise than out of a commensurability
one, because in the latter case the rights are seen as "naturally" rather than strategically
superior.
32. Ronald Dworkin, A Reply By Ronald Dworkin, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CON-
TEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 247 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1984); see also Ronald Dworkin,
On Gaps in the Law, in CONTROVERSIES ABOUT LAW'S ONTOLOGY 84 (Paul Amselek &
Neil MacCormick eds., 1991). The structure of this debate is worth noting. In response to
Dworkin's marquee claim that there is a right answer to most legal controversies, id., some
critics have claimed that this requires an (unjustified) belief in the commensurability of
values, for without commensurability there would be no right answer in those cases in
which incommensurable values clashed. See John Finnis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHrs 116 (1980); John Finnis, Concluding Reflections, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 231 (1990);
John Finnis, On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire, 6 L. & PHIL. 357 (1987); John
Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRU-
DENCE, supra, at 161. To this Dworkin has responded, A Reply, supra, at 271-75, that our
ability to make comparisons may presuppose commensurability more than we think, for
the making of comparisons is to impose a framework of commensurability on things that
might, the need to compare aside, be conceptually incommensurate. Thus, even if we can-
not say that a rock is more (or less) heavy than a line is long, we can say whether we would
rather have one hundred pounds of gold or two strings of pearls. Thus it may be that all
comparisons to Dworkin are teleological, necessarily involving a comparison for some pur-
pose, and thus necessarily imposing a commensurating value on a possibly incommensura-
ble world. See also SUSAN HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS (1989); Kenneth Kress, Legal
Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 335-36 (1989). An incisive overview and evaluation
of this controversy is in BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 96-106
(1993).
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institutions other than majoritarian ones decide whether and when
majoritarian decisions will simply be trumped by strong, incommensu-
rable, and deontologically derived rights.33
The Dworkinian picture, however, runs into some difficulty in
dealing with nonconsequentialist but also nonabsolute rights. Even
nonconsequentialist side constraints may be themselves overridden in
some circumstances, not just by other and stronger rights, but by a
sufficiently strongly arrayed collection of simple interests (or "public
values"), such as the "compelling interest"34 and "clear and present
danger"35 standards in American constitutional law. As a result, it
then might be difficult to say, other than by recognizing the commen-
surability between rights and interests, just how it is that a large
enough quantity of interests can override a right.36 And perhaps it is
just in the difficulty (although not, I believe, in the impossibility 37) of
making this case that we find the premise of the argument that a belief
in incommensurability will in practice secure a stronger protection for
individual rights than would a belief in commensurability.
Yet it is precisely at this point that we confront the central ques-
tion of just how different views about commensurability affect some-
what more concrete constitutional decisionmaking. Implicit in most
of the anticommensurability writing, it seems to me, is a fear of the
risk, to put it into the free speech rhetoric of the 1950s and the 1960s,
that rights might be "balanced away."'38 The opponents of commensu-
rability seem to worry that recognizing the commensurability of rights
and nonrights interests will produce a process through which rights
33. Ronald Dworkin, Constitutional Cases, Justice and Rights, aid Taking Rights Seri-
ously, in DwoRKIN, TAKING RIr=s SERIOUSLY, supra note 16, at 131, 150, 184.
34. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Implicit in the point in the text is that the
"compelling interest" standard is no longer "fatal in fact," Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972), but is a very high standard in fact overcome on occasion.
E.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 495
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring). 'The point in the text of course applies as well to the height-
ened but somewhat less stringent standard applied in gender discrimination cases. Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
35. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
36. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27
GA. L. REv. 343 (1993).
37. Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. Rtv. 415
(1993).
38. E.g., Laurent Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.. 1424
(1962); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 38 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
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will be less often and less vigorously protected, just because they are
seen as being of the same species as interests.
The fears of the anticommensurability proponents are hardly
groundless. Although it is possible, both in theory and in practice, for
balancing methodologies to be highly protective of individual rights
against the claims of non-rights-based interests,39 it is plausible to sup-
pose that thinking of individual rights and public interests in roughly
the same terms could produce less solicitude of individual fights than
might otherwise be the case. First, claimants of individual rights, sys-
tematically with respect to some rights, might be somewhat unattrac-
tive right-bearers, as with many bearers of free speech and criminal
procedure rights.4° More significantly, however, the most salient fea-
ture of an individual rights claim under a balancing methodology pre-
supposing commensurability will be the claim of one individual
against the fundamentally similar (according to the commensurability
presupposition) claims of many, with the consequent expected prefer-
ence for the claims of the many against the claims of the one. Com-
mensurability may not, it could be argued, provide sufficient resources
to resist the attraction of seeing a multiperson public interest as supe-
rior to one individual's personal claim.41
There is, of course, no reason why this must be so. Even under a
strict utilitarian calculation, a significant loss of utility by one person
can plainly outweigh a slight loss of utility by many. A sophisticated
consequentialist calculation will include within the consequences of an
act the effect of that act on other acts and other decisions, such that
the essentially empirical "slippery slope," "dangerous precedent," and
39. See Gerald Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case
of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1972).
40. The premise of this claim is that a reasonably high percentage of claimants of
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment criminal procedure rights are in fact guilty of the
crimes charged, and that a reasonably high percentage of claimants of First Amendment
free speech rights are, like the Nazis in National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie,
432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam), the Ku Klux Klan in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (per curiam), and the cross-burners in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992), unpleasant people with unpleasant things to say. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery
Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1985).
41. On these problems, see Derek Parfit, Innumerate Ethics, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 285
(1978) (applying utilitarian analysis to reach the ultimate conclusion that the course of
action that benefits the largest number of people is the most desired), responding to John
M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PuB. An'. 293 (1977) (applying utilita-
rian analysis and concluding that the relative numbers of people who will be affected by
various benefit distribution alternatives, as a factor in itself, should not play a significant
role in choosing among them).
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"weakness of the will" phenomena 42 will be taken into account by the
ideal utilitarian calibrator. But in a world in which calibrators may be
less than ideal, it is more plausible to suppose that a decisional frame-
work in which individual rights and public interest claims are seen as
members of the same species will incline more rather than less in the
direction of underrecognition rather than overrecognition of the indi-
vidual rights claims.
The concepts of underrecognition and overrecognition, however,
presuppose some antecedent conception of the correct degree of rec-
ognition of some particular individual right, or of individual rights in
general. I do not deny this, and thus my essentially empirical claim is
that, given some antecedent conception of this ideal result or set of
results, it is likely, but by no means inevitable, and by no means
equally likely at all times and in all places, that fostering the view that
rights and interests are commensurable will in practice produce under-
protection of individual rights.
Yet it is important to recognize the possibility that a belief in
commensurability may, at certain times, or in certain places, or with
respect to certain decisions, produce a closer approximation to the
ideal than would a rejection of commensurability. Most obviously,
this would occur if at some time there were an extant overprotection
rather than underprotection of some individual right. For example, if
people thought of the right to keep and bear arms as a natural human
right and a strong deontological side constraint on consequentialist
calculations of the public interest, then promotion of the belief that
keeping and bearing arms was designed to serve a value commensura-
ble and tradable with the values of public safety in general might be a
strategy well designed to reduce an extant over protection and thus
produce a result more consonant with the stipulated ideal. Those who
think that free speech rights in the United States have gone too far,
and have been granted at the excess expense of other interests, might
be well-advised to try to characterize free speech in consequentialist
rather than deontological terms. This characterization would support
the argument that getting a bit more of something else in exchange for
a bit less free speech is not fundamentally different from the kinds of
consequentialist calculations that dominate policymaking in general.
More broadly, perhaps those who see an excessive protection of indi-
42. As well as other phenomena focusing on how the decision in this case will affect
the decisions in other and future cases. See JJ.C. Smart, Extreme and Restricted Utilitari-
anism, 6 PHIL. Q. 344 (1956); Gregory W. Trianosky, Rule-Utilitarianism and the Slippery
Slope, 75 J. PHIm. 414 (1978).
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vidual rights generally, at the expense of community interests,43 would
be well-advised to stake their claim with commensurability, seemingly
the best way to deflate what they see as an existing overuse of rights
rhetoric and a consequent overprotection of rights and underprotec-
tion of interests.
Under other circumstances, or from different perspectives, pro-
moting a belief in commensurability might increase the level of recog-
nition of some right that is widely undervalued. If particular classes of
people are not considered people at all,4 4 or are considered less than
full persons, then treating every person as counting for one will in-
crease the respect given to those who had hitherto counted as less
than one.45 Similarly, if some harms are currently undercompensated,
then promoting a view pursuant to which all harms should be compen-
sated with money might increase the recognition of some harms, even
if promoting that view at the same time flattened the diversity among
types of harms. The history of civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983, for example, might be to some a history of reprehensibly
assuming that the harms of discrimination can be reduced to mere
dollars. However, it might more plausibly be seen as a history of in-
creasing recognition of theoretically (perhaps) incommensurable
harms precisely because of a willingness to put these harms into the
43. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLIT-
ICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
44. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SO-
CIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985) (showing that placing a dollar value on the life of a child
was once considered a moral advance compared to the practice of allowing only adults to
recover tort damages, or compared to the practice of making life insurance unavailable for
the lives of children) (I am grateful to Martha Minow for directing me to this fascinating
study); see also Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of
Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990) (describing the history of allowing mothers
to recover tort damages for the shock or fright incurred upon witnessing injuries to their
children).
45. I believe it worthwhile to question the universality of a perspective insistently
troubled by the tendency of commensurability perspectives to underappreciate the diver-
sity of value and the diversity of human experience. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990); 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 230 (1985);
Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990). It is
indeed a bad thing to underappreciate the diversity of human experience, but it is also a
bad thing to draw distinctions where none ought to exist (there are good reasons for not
castigating the Thomas Jefferson of ". . . all Men Are Created Equal" as a reductionist).
Thus, it might be that at times a focus on the commensurability of value will be a way of
driving unfortunate distinctions out of public discourse and out of public understanding.
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same monetary (and conceptual, which is why we call them constitu-
tional torts) hopper as we put more traditionally recognized harms. 46
Nothing in the foregoing presupposes that money must be the
unit of measurement. Consider Cass Sunstein's argument against
commensurability, an argument in which he places great weight on
examples like the following, originally developed by Raz in The Mo-
rality of Freedom:
[I]f an employer tells you that, as an employee performing a certainjob, you must spend a month away from your home and family, you
might well agree. But if someone tells you that he will pay you a
monthly salary in order to persuade you to spend a month away
from home and family, you will probably feel insulted and de-
graded, and you may well turn him down.47
I wonder. If we look at this example against a background of employ-
ers being excessively willing to attempt to cajole (or coerce) employ-
ees of profit-making companies to make personal sacrifices without
compensation for the "good of the company," then the example looks
quite different. Offering compensation against a history or social
practice of overcoercion and undercompensation could then be seen
as a way of telling the employee that the employer considers her time
and sacrifice to be just as valuable as the company's bottom line.
Moreover, the offer is, perhaps, a way of giving the employee a choice
she might not otherwise perceived herself as having had. Note that in
the example the offer of money is considered bad by Sunstein and Raz
in part because it increases the possibility of refusal. But perhaps that
is what makes the offer of money good. If not offering money in-
creases the possibility of the employer getting what he wants, and get-
ting it for nothing, then it is difficult to understand why that state of
affairs is necessarily to be desired.
Or consider another of Sunstein's examples, one in which he sug-
gests that asking an adult neighbor to mow one's lawn for money
will often [be regarded] as an insult, because it reflects an inappro-
priate valuation of the neighbor. The request embodies an im-
proper conception of what the relationship is, or of the attitude with
46. Thus, it may be that by treating certain values as incommensurable we undercom-
pensate those who bear the costs of public acceptance of those (or other) values. See Fred-
erick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. Rav. 1321 (1992) [hereinafter
Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech]. Were we to see free speech and reputation, or free
speech and privacy, as commensurable, we might be more willing to compensate (in some
way, but not necessarily a monetary way) those whose reputations or privacy are sacrificed
to society's free speech or free press interests, just as we compensate people with money
through the takings clause when, for public purposes, we take away something (land) ordi-
narily thought of as commensurable with, and thus more plausibly compensable by, money.
47. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 786 (emphasis in original).
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which neighbors render services for each other. The impropriety
remains even if the offeree ordinarily would regard the offered
wage as a fair price for an hour of mowing services.48
Again, the example is problematic, in part because it likewise seems to
ignore the possibility that the baseline against which it operates might
be one of undercompensation, or one in which there could be a moral
case for treating different things similarly.49 Put aside as a red herring
the possibility that everything can or should be valued in money. With
this aside, consider the difference between the case in which I simply
ask my neighbor to mow my lawn because I am unexpectedly away
from home longer than anticipated and the case in which, having
asked (and received) this favor of my neighbor, I then, upon my re-
turn, make it my business to "repay the favor" by finding out what my
neighbor considers a particularly odious task and voluntarily perform-
ing it for her, or perhaps by doing, over time, roughly as many favors,
at my inconvenience, for my neighbor as she does for me. Now if I am
overly precise, perhaps this tit-for-tat view will excessively quantify
the relationship and will be as infuriating as is the behavior of some-
one who insists on splitting a large dinner check down to the last
penny, including taking into account the fact that one of us ordered a
slightly less expensive dessert. But putting this annoying precision
aside, it is quite possible that recognizing the commensurability of my
effort and my neighbor's effort, or my inconvenience and hers, will
over time be a recognition of greater respect rather than of less. Thus,
although it is often the case that a belief in commensurability will pro-
duce an insufficient or inappropriate mode of valuation, examples like
these suggest that often a belief in incommensurability will produce
undervaluation, and that a belief in commensurability, both in per-
48. Id. at 787.
49. I think this is a large point. That is, I think that the debate about commensurabil-
ity is, at least in part, an instantiation of a larger debate about the morality of categoriza-
tion. The flavor of most modem anticommensurability writing is the flavor of a penchant
for the particular, and of an aversion to the ways in which categories necessarily flatten the
diversity of human experience and the diversity of human difference. Although no one
denies the importance or necessity of categories that inevitably collapse differences among
their members, there is still a recognizable difference between perspectives that focus on
the importance of particularization (and here I am thinking of important strands of femi-
nist theory, among others) and perspectives that either resist or seek to contextualize argu-
ments about the virtues of particularization. In a world of plural low-level values,
commensurability perspectives that gather these diverse low-level values into encompass-
ing and flattening categories operate analogously to the ways in which categories of all
types flatten the differences among their members, and rules flatten the potential differ-
ences among more context-specific and particular decisions.
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sonal life and in constitutional law, may be in some contexts more of a
cure than a disease.
Iv
I do not intend for the foregoing discussion to be definitive.
Rather, I only suggest the kinds of concerns we might explore with
respect to commensurability in numerous contexts, including interper-
sonal dealings, constitutional questions often discussed under the
"balancing" rubric, and a host of issues commonly thought of in the
context of debates about the use and misuse, the morality or immoral-
ity, of cost-benefit analysis.50 But I do not offer any more than this
sketchy discussion because it is not my goal to try to resolve any of
these disputes, but rather to focus on the methodology by which we
think about them.
The key feature of the foregoing discussion, therefore, is not the
correctness or incorrectness of any of my suggestions about commen-
surability, but rather the suggestion that a view about commensurabil-
ity might be selected on a basis other than the inherent or intrinsic
moral correctness of one view or another. Rather, it is implicit in the
foregoing discussion that a view about commensurability should for
some purposes be selected in a frankly empirical and instrumental
manner for the tendency of the view to advance those moral positions
that are, unlike a position about commensurability, morally primary
rather than morally instrumental.51
The locus classicus of this approach is John Stuart Mill's discus-
sion of "justice" in Chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, a chapter entitled "On
the Connexion Between Justice and Utility. '52 Although I do not
50. The discussion of (and critique of) cost-benefit analysis most attentive to connect-
ing the legal issues about cost-benefit analysis with the philosophical questions about com-
mensurability is Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public
Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 936 (1991).
51. On the empirical and instrumental component of the debates about legal com-
mensurability, see Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE
L.. 56, 80-86 (1993). My view is also consistent with the suggestion in Richard H. Pildes,
Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1520, 1545-49 (1992) (book re-
view), but Pildes relies in part on a Pragmatist conception of value I believe is extraneous
to the instrumental point I wish to develop, and also describes the effect of a belief in
commensurability (and incommensurability) in sufficiently acontextual or universal terms
as to be unfaithful to his own Pragmatist and my instrumentalist inclinations on this issue.
As I shall explain below, believing that the issue is more instrumental than ontological
(although it could be both) entails a strong commitment to taking seriously both sides of
the commensurability debate.
52. Mill, Utilitarianism, supra note 5, at 226.
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want to engage in Millian exegesis here, and therefore make no claims
to offer the "best" or most "authentic" interpretation of Mill's
thought, one plausible reading of this Chapter is that Mill does not
believe that the traditional requirements or maxims of justice, insofar
as they diverge from the mandate to maximize utility, are intrinsically
correct, and certainly not superior or even co-equal to the principle of
utility. But then he goes on to say that it is nevertheless possible that
justice is a name for certain moral requirements, which, regarded
collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are there-
fore of more paramount obligation, than any others; though particu-
lar cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important,
as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice.53
Because the positive effect of the maxims of justice on social utility is
thus collective and not individual, Mill argues that the maxims of jus-
tice should be "guarded by a sentiment"54 (and accompanying sanc-
tions) designed to entrench these generally useful maxims, which will
in turn promote the aggregate maximization of utility.
Subsequent writers have elaborated on Mill's ideas in offering the
utilitarian case for utilitarian dispositions,55 but my point here is not
about or restricted to utilitarianism. Rather it is about the instrumen-
tal relation of some principles to others within any philosophical
framework. For my purposes, the importance of Mill's discussion of
justice is in pointing out that the positions that others perceive to be
morally primary may still be important instrumentally even if we re-
ject their moral primacy.5 6 But this point is hardly exclusive to utilita-
rianism among the range of cognitivist (that is, nonrelativist and
53. Id. at 248.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Robert M. Adams, Motive Utilitarianism, 73 J. PHIL. 467 (1976); Philip
Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan, Restrictive Consequentialism, 64 Ausw. J. PHIL. 438 (1986).
There is a difference between developing a disposition because having that disposition will
generally increase utility (like having the disposition not to like television, even though
having that disposition will sometimes keep one from watching utility-enhancing television
shows) and following some rule or mid-level principle because following it will increase
utility. Still, the basic point of the two strategies is similar. See Michael D. Bayles, Mid-
Level Principles and Justification, in JUSTIFICATION: NOMOS XXVIII 49 (J. Roland Pen-
nock & John W. Chapman eds., 1986); Margaret Jane Radin, Mid-Level Principles and
Non-Ideal Justification, in JUSTIFICATION: NOMOS XXVIII, supra, at 33.
56. To reject their moral primacy is not to reject the importance of engaging in the
inquiry that produces the conclusion of a value's moral nonprimacy. Mill was no Pragma-
tist, and Mill was no noncognitivist. He had a position about the primacy of justice, that
justice was not morally primary. My point here is that there can be a useful inquiry about
which midlevel ideas (or ideals or dispositions) to promote. This inquiry is different from,
but does not supplant (because we must know what it is that instrumental values are to be
instrumental to), the ontological inquiry about what the primary moral values are.
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nonsubjectivist) metaethical beliefs. Any cognitivist metaethics (in-
cluding one that took justice to be a moral primary) still has the need
for various instrumental props designed to ensure the maximum reali-
zation of primary moral values. And that is why it is so important to
distinguish instrumental perspectives, useful adjuncts to the full range
of moral frameworks, from consequential theories taking a position on
the nature of primary values. Thus it is entirely consistent for Ronald
Dworkin as an anticonsequentialist to argue that judicial review is in-
strumentally important in securing the maximum protection of de-
ontologically founded rights, just because of the unlikelihood that
majorities will be as effective in recognizing and enforcing rights
against themselves. And just as certain concrete institutions, such as
courts, might serve this instrumental function, then so can certain be-
liefs, attitudes, and dispositions. Guilt, for example, might not be a
moral primary, in the sense that in an ideal world people would be
expected to do the right thing because it was right and not because
they would feel bad if they do not. Still, in a nonideal world guilt has
its uses. In a nonideal world people feeling guilty when they do what
is wrong might be good just because this ancillary enforcement mech-
anism ensures a higher degree of compliance with moral norms than
might be the case if compliance with those norms rested solely on peo-
ple's intrinsic desires to do the right thing.
If the instrumental point about courts and other formal institu-
tions applies to ideas and dispositions, and this is my point about guilt
and Mill's about justice, then it seems quite possible that the same
perspective might usefully be applied to views about commensurabil-
ity as well. Suppose, similarly to Mill's treatment of justice, we have
moral beliefs that reject, as a matter of moral ontology, the idea of
incommensurability. Suppose, therefore, we do not believe that any
version of utility, or anything else, can provide the common metric for
comparisons of value and that certain values are intrinsically, at bed-
rock, incommensurable. Incommensurability is just part of the moral
furniture of the world. In short, we believe arguments for incommen-
surability to be correct as a matter of moral ontology.
Yet, even if we (and the "we" gets tricky here, for reasons I will
explore) hold these ontological beliefs, we might nevertheless con-
clude that a widespread public or official belief in incommensurability
would have negative moral consequences. Suppose, for example, that
a public belief in incommensurability produced for many people the
associated belief that there was no point in engaging in extensive
anguish trying to weigh incommensurable values against each other.
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In other words, suppose, not implausibly, that a belief in incommensu-
rability produced in many people the associated belief that moral de-
liberation was quite often futile and that it would be best to go with
one's first instincts rather than trying to work out the unworkable.
Suppose, as well, that a belief in commensurability, a belief that there
was an answer there if only we would take the trouble to struggle for
it, led people towards the path of more, rather than less, effort in their
attempts to work out the answers to moral problems. If this were the
case, then even if incommensurability might be correct as a matter of
ideal moral theory, adopting or inculcating a belief in commensurabil-
ity might still produce better results in a nonideal world, just as for
Mill the inculcation or adoption of a belief in the maxims of justice
would produce the best results, even though it was utility and not the
maxims of justice that best represented the morally correct position.57
This conclusion applies in more concrete contexts as well. Sup-
pose that a widely held belief in incommensurability produced an at-
mosphere of pervasive undercompensation for harms to others.
Suppose that a belief in incommensurability produced, for example,
an unwillingness to compensate people for injuries just because the
best (or at least the most common) form of compensation we now
have, money, is inadequate. Then suppose someone visits my house
and accidentally damages an irreplaceable work of art for which I
have great personal and aesthetic affection. If the visitor immediately
took out her checkbook and said, "How much?", I would resent her
underappreciation of the irreplaceability of the item she had broken.
But if she apologized profusely without an offer of compensation
(which in most circumstances I would reject), I might equally resent
the ease with which she had moved from the fact of irreplaceability to
the lack of any obligation on her part to try, however ineffectively, to
replace the irreplaceable. Thus, even though the loss I suffer might be
genuinely incommensurable, a compensatory approximation might
still be morally better than nothing at all. Additionally, fostering a
public belief in commensurability (as in fostering the belief that all
harms can and should be compensated with money), despite the onto-
logical correctness of incommensurability, might also produce in the
57. I recall a similar point being made in conversation by Isaac Levi, who in the con-
text of analogous debates about whether moral dilemmas exist (see, e.g., WALTER SIN-
NrOTr-ARMSTRONG, MORAL DILEMMAS (1988); Earl Conee, Against Moral Dilemmas, 91
PHIL. REV. 87 (1982)) argued that we might wish to believe that moral dilemmas do not
exist (even if they do), because believing in the nonexistence of moral dilemmas will pre-
vent people from throwing up their hands in despair prematurely, and prevent them from
making arbitrary decisions when better decisions might be available.
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aggregate better (measured against our moral primaries, of which in-
commensurability would be only a small part) results.
A belief in commensurability may also produce better results
when the law correctly takes away something for which nothing is
commensurate. If my property is justifiably taken for public use, a
widespread belief in commensurability might produce more compen-
sation, and thus more recognition of my sacrifice, than would have
otherwise been the case. Similarly, when reputations are harmed for
the public good, or when people are treated unequally for the public
good, or when privacy is invaded for the public good, a belief in the
commensurability, rather than in the incommensurability, of these
harms might produce a morally desirable attempt at some sort of
compensation.58
At times the situation might, of course, be just the opposite. The
ease of compensation, as in the case of the person at my house who
reaches for her checkbook instead of apologizing, or the state whose
ability to award just compensation may lead it too easily to assume
that it can buy off people's memories or experiences or life plans, may
in a nonideal world produce morally suboptimal results. If this is the
case, then it might be advisable to adopt and to inculcate a belief in
incommensurability, and to do so even if commensurability is correct
as a matter of ideal theory. Thus, to run the previous argument in the
opposite direction, we might believe, were we good consequentialists,
that commensurability was correct, but that a belief in commensura-
bility led to a widespread but erroneous assumption that money was
the appropriate unit of commensuration. Or it might be the case that
a belief in commensurability led to undervaluation in practice, such
that a belief in incommensurability prevented the kind of undervalua-
tion that seems to be at the heart of many objections to
commensurability.
Were this the case, then it might be consequentially desirable to
adopt or to inculcate incommensurability as a disposition even if in-
commensurability was incorrect as a disposition-independent moral
primary, just as for Mill the desire to adopt or to inculcate the disposi-
tion of justice was consequentially desirable even though justice was
not a disposition-independent moral primary. From this perspective,
the debate about commensurability might usefully be redirected into a
more empirical one about the tendencies of certain dispositions and
58. Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, supra note 46.
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away from one about the intrinsic correctness of one view or another
about commensurability.5 9
One possible rejoinder would be to wonder if anything turns on
this argument. That is, if, as Mill maintains, believing in justice pro-
duces maximum utility, then why is the state of affairs in which people
believe in justice instrumentally any different, except as irrelevant ab-
stract speculation, from a state of affairs in which people believe in
justice simpliciter, or a state of affairs in which justice as a moral pri-
mary is simply true? The response to this, however, is that by recog-
nizing that at least some beliefs or dispositions are justified by their
empirical tendencies rather than by their intrinsic correctness, we rec-
ognize that these empirical tendencies might go in different directions
at different times, in different places, and in different contexts.
Whether this is true or not with respect to justice and utility, it seems
more likely true with respect to views about incommensurability. At
certain times and in certain places the problems may be ones of un-
dercompensation and undervaluation and excess attention to poten-
tially illegitimate differences among people and values, and at other
times and in other places the problems may be ones of excess willing-
ness to trade lives against money, or excess unwillingness to recognize
59. Throughout this discussion I put aside what would be difficult questions from
some nonconsequentialist and some consequentialist perspectives. These questions con-
cern transparency, or, to put it more bluntly, honesty. The questions do not arise when,
with full knowledge, we are training ourselves to have certain dispositions that we know we
would not want to have were conditions ideal. They do arise, however, when those with
the power to promote certain ideas, ideals, dispositions, and attitudes do so from a sense
(which obviously they believe, even if erroneously) that it is important for the masses to
have attitudes that they themselves do not see the need to have. This perspective, de-
scribed by Bernard Williams as "Government House Utilitarianism," BERNARD WILLIAMS,
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 108-10 (1985), and castigated by many since then,
Hare, Comments, in HARE AND His CRITICS: ESSAYS ON MORAL THINKING 199 (D. Sea-
nor & N. Fotion eds., 1988); Scanlon, Levels of Moral Thinking, in HARE AND His CRITICS:
ESSAYS ON MORAL THINKING, supra, at 129; and Williams, The Structure of Hare's Theory,
in HARE AND HIs CRITICS: ESSAYS ON MORAL THINKING, supra, at 185, is not to me as
undeniably reprehensible as many think, because it may be morally obligatory to take ac-
tions to prevent the moral mistakes of others. To put it differently, respect for the moral
autonomy of others is only one among many values. Thus respect may at times yield to a
moral imperative to disrespect another's moral autonomy and prevent her from making
moral mistakes. For a beginning of an account of when and why this might be so, see
Frederick Schauer, The Asymmetry of Authority, in PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILO-
SOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 128-34
(1991). But recognizing that there is much more to be said about this question, I will do no
more here than simply acknowledge it as a difficulty. I do so perhaps more for the typical
nonconsequentialist thinking about whether to promote a belief in the commensurability
of values than for the typical consequentialist trying to promote, in the fashion of Mill, a
belief in the incommensurability of values.
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the diversity of human experiences. Only by treating the instrumental
inquiry as different from the primary one do we keep open the possi-
bility that instrumental values are context-sensitive in a way that
noninstrumental ones are not.
The foregoing makes clear that the position I describe as "instru-
mental" is not the same as the cluster of positions commonly de-
scribed as "pragmatist." The real pragmatist, or perhaps I should say
"Pragmatist" with a capital "P," would object to my characterization
of instrumental views about commensurability as "midlevel," for to
the true Pragmatist there is no higher level that this midlevel is below.
My view is therefore more modest. Although what I say might be
compatible with Pragmatism, it is also compatible with anti-Pragmatist
views having a more firmly objectivist or cognitivist view about the
nonreducible moral primacy of things like, for example, utility, or
equal concern and respect. My point is that even such anti-
Pragmatists, regardless of whether they are consequentialist anti-
Pragmatists or nonconsequentialist anti-Pragmatists, would have use
for instrumental midlevel principles or ideas selected on the basis of
the tendency of a principle or idea best to promote the primary values,
whatever those primary values happen to be under some particular
metaethical position.
V
In trying to deflate some of the moral rhetoric surrounding the
commensurability debate in legal and constitutional context, I take on
a portion of what turns out to be a somewhat larger agenda. With
some frequency, positions that I would argue are midlevel and instru-
mental are commonly treated as morally primary. Consider the tradi-
tional arguments about judicial review. These arguments are all too
often conducted in the language of political legitimacy, moral legiti-
macy, and the atemporal and largely acontextual desirability (or unde-
sirability) of one or another view about judicial review, and about the
methods of constitutional interpretation.
But suppose we think of the question of judicial review, like the
question of commensurability, instrumentally. That is, suppose we
think of judicial review generally, and methods of constitutional inter-
pretation by the courts specifically, simply as devices of institutional
design, mechanisms for securing more primary values. Were that the
case, we would see a marked decrease in theories of judicial review or
judicial legitimacy, or theories of constitutional interpretation, because
there is something about a theory, unlike a strategy, or a tactic, or a
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device, that suggests deep-seated moral or political foundations, not
changeable by a simple change in personnel or political winds. But it
is hardly clear that judicial review, or the importance of attending to
or ignoring the intentions of the drafters, is morally primary in the
way in which equality or autonomy or utility might be morally pri-
mary.60 So if accounts (not theories) of judicial review are not pri-
mary, then the best test of such an account, including a normative
account, would be a test that measured that account's tendency to ad-
vance something that is morally or politically primary.
Midlevel and instrumental devices for the furtherance of primary
values need not be structures such as courts or institutions like judicial
review. They can be ideas, ideals, conceptions, and attitudes, such as
Mill's view of justice, and my view of commensurability. But when we
deflate the moral rhetoric and think of some ideas and institutions
instrumentally, the way we think about these ideas and institutions
changes as well. First of all, questions that might otherwise have been
nonempirical become empirical. For example, whether a belief in jus-
tice will maximize utility, or a belief in incommensurability will in-
crease the solicitude for individual rights, are essentially empirical
issues, investigatable by empirical methods. One of these methods,
but hardly the only one, is, like Mill's empirical speculations about the
effect of a belief in justice on utility, individual observation of the
world and generalization from those individual observations. But
there are others as well, and it may be important to keep in mind the
testability in theory (and sometimes in practice) of empirical specula-
tion about the effect of belief in some idea on some set of practices.
Insofar as the issues are empirical, they are also changeable.
When we adopt an idea, or a theory, based on a certain empirical state
of the world, we remain open to the possibility that under different
empirical conditions we might want to promote different and even
contrary ideas, or internalize different and even contrary dispositions,
or adopt different and even contrary theoretical frameworks. Thus,
what Jack Balkin has referred to as "theoretical opportunism"'61 might
60. I acknowledge but bracket here the issue whether democracy is a moral primary,
or is instead just a decision-making device. The more we think of democracy (or, for the
finicky, majority rule) as itself being a moral primary, the less a discourse about judicial
legitimacy will be susceptible to this instrumental account.
61. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REv.
869, 880 (1993). This is a commentary on Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25
CONN. L. Rv. 797 (1993) (The Day, Berry, and Howard Lecture), and what I say here is
partly in response to Balkin, although there may be little difference between us. I believe
we agree that all of law as we know it is itself instrumental, that neither law nor its good-
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no longer bear the stigma that even Balkin's (in fact sympathetic) use
of the word "opportunism" suggests. Consider the lawyer who argues
in one case that the best evidence rule admits a given item of non-
documentary evidence, and a week later in a different case argues that
the best evidence rule precludes use of substantially the same type of
evidence. Implicit in withholding moral condemnation on the grounds
of inconsistency is the view that in this context the interests of the
client are primary, and the use of some legal position or another in the
service of the primary interest is to be evaluated only instrumentally.
The question, then, and I mean to put it as a question and no
more, is one of determining the point at which instrumental selection
on empirical grounds runs into dishonest inconsistency. Part of the
answer to this question would be less about moral theory than about
speech act theory, in the sense that it would be an account of what
kinds of representations we make when we make assertions about the
law. If the pragmatics (small "p"-in opposition to semantics, and
nothing to do with Pragmatism) of legal assertion is such that the law-
yer who makes claims about the state of the law with respect to the
best evidence rule is not taken to have made claims about what she
thinks the law is, or about what she thinks the law ought to be, then
she is doing nothing dishonest in making a nonfrivolous argument for
L at one time and a nonfrivolous argument for not-L at another. But
the pragmatics of other contexts of legal or moral assertion might be
different, and thus there might be a difference between, on the one
hand, arguing in court that the best evidence rule keeps out an item of
evidence while believing the best evidence rule to be a bad idea, and
on the other hand, arguing publicly that judicial review is valuable or
that values are commensurable while believing judicial review to be a
bad idea and that values are incommensurable.
ness is morally primary, and that there is nothing about the category or concept of law that
cannot and should not be evaluated instrumentally. Indeed, there may be no concept of
law at all. I develop this idea further in a series of forthcoming articles. Frederick Schauer,
Positivism as Pariah, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL PosrrIsM (Robert
George ed., forthcoming 1994); Frederick Schauer, Fuller's Internal Point of View, 14 L. &
PmL. (forthcoming 1994); Frederick Schauer, Norms and Normativity: A Defense of Sim-
ple Positivism, CAN. J. PHrL. (forthcoming 1994). At times, however, Balkin takes what he
calls "ideological drift," and what I would call the strategic use of values, one step further
than I would, as when he says things like "There is no group of persons whose judgments of
political morality escape the play of drift," Balkin, supra at 883, or "normative argument is
a boat in which we are all in together, and that boat is always drifting." Id. For my part I
want to deny the existence of normative drift on the primary level (and I suppose that is
what it is to be a moral cognitivist), while admitting and welcoming it on lower instrumen-
tal levels.
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Even when we sort out the pragmatics, however, we are left with
difficult moral questions about the circumstances under which "we"
would try to foster certain beliefs that "we" did not believe because
"we" believed that those beliefs, in the hands of "them," would pro-
duce the morally best world.62
Perhaps the answer is "never." But even if the answer is "never,"
and a fortiori if it is not, there remain serious questions about the
kinds of attitudes, ideas, ideals, and dispositions we ought to decide
that all of us should have. This question may turn out to be more
often instrumental than we think, and the question of whether we
should accept, in this place and at this time, the idea of commensura-
bility, as opposed to the question whether commensurability, at any
place and at any time, is correct, is as good a place as any to start.
62. This is a central question in R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEsvrs,
METHOD AND PoIr (1981), although Hare's distinction between "archangels" and
"proles," id. at 44, can hardly have been calculated to generate maximum sympathy for his
enterprise.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
